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Perspectives on Sovereignty in The Current Context:
A Canadian Viewpoint
Donat Pharand*
Law alone is sovereign. Every subject of law who claims to be sover-
eign immediately rises up against the law and denies it.'
n spite of the abhorrence one might have for the concept of sover-
eignty, it is still with us. State sovereignty remains basically the cor-
ner-stone of international law, in spite of certain important limitations
which have come to restrict its scope. This should become evident as
the present Conference unfolds.
After an overview of the historical and contemporary meaning of
sovereignty, this paper will examine briefly the main corollaries of that
concept: the equality of states, their territorial integrity and political
independence, and the non-intervention in their internal affairs. It will
then review two areas of international law where certain limitations to
sovereignty have been developed: the immunity of jurisdiction in for-
eign courts and intervention for humanitarian purposes. The paper will
not touch upon the role which sovereignty plays in numerous other ar-
eas such as the settlement of disputes, the protection of the environ-
ment, the law of the sea, international organizations, the protection of
human rights, taxation laws and international trade. Most of these will
be dealt with during the course of the Conference. The paper will con-
clude by a tentative prognosis as to the future of sovereignty.
I. SOVEREIGNTY: AN OVERVIEW
A. Historical Meaning
Georges Scelle, a French jurist and philosopher, defined sover-
eignty as "the competence of competence." He meant, by that, the
power for a subject of law (in this case, the state) to determine for
itself, in complete freedom, the extent of its rights and duties.2
This kind of definition of state sovereignty is based on the notion
of absolute sovereignty developed by Jean Bodin, who seems to have
been the first to provide a comprehensive definition. For Bodin, the re-
public represented a sovereign power. Sovereignty, he wrote, "is the
* Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada.
Georges Scelle, Tome I, PR cIs DE DROIT DES GENS 13 (1932), cited in Hubert Thierry, I
EUR. J. INT'L LAW 198 (1990).
2 See 1 INTRODUCTION )L L'frTUDE DU DROIT 76 (1953).
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absolute and perpetual power of a Republic."' However, Bodin was
careful to specify that absolute power did not mean without limitation
by any law. Referring to the sovereignty of the Prince, he affirmed:
"[ilf we say that he has absolute power, is not subject to laws, there
would not be a sovereign Prince in the world: since all the Princes of
the earth are subject to the laws of God, and of nature, and to many
human laws common to all peoples."' 4 It is, therefore, evident that Bo-
din's definition of sovereignty did not exclude limitations imposed by
international law. Indeed he seemed to have envisaged such limitations.
Nevertheless, Jean Bodin appears to be looked upon generally as the
father of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, in the radical sense used
by Hobbes and Spinoza.5
Be that as it may, state sovereignty came to be accepted as a prin-
ciple of international law at the Peace of Westphalia, ending the Thirty
Years' War, in 1648. In those peace treaties, the German territorial
princes were recognized as being absolute sovereigns over the defined
limits of their territory. This doctrine of absolute sovereignty has
loomed large in the background of writings of publicists and the prac-
tice of states ever since.
B. Contemporary Meaning
For analytical purposes, it is convenient to distinguish internal sov-
ereignty from external sovereignty.
Internal sovereignty is the power of a state to decide for itself, and
without any outside interference, what system of government and re-
lated institutions it will have and the extent to which it will exercise
that sovereign power within its territorial boundaries. Professor Charles
Rousseau finds that the jurisdiction of a sovereign state has three char-
acteristics: it is exclusive, meaning that there is only one central au-
thority; it is autonomous, indicating that the state authority is not sub-
ject to any outside control and has complete discretion; and it is
plenary, giving an independent state full power to determine the extent
of its own competence over its territory.6 It should be remembered, of
course, that this complete jurisdiction on the part of a sovereign state
to do as it pleases within its own territory will be limited considerably
by the rule of law in countries where it exists. There, the sovereignty of
3 Ls SIX LIVRES DE LA RtPUBLIQUE 122 (1576), quoted in Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty
and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 452, 445, n.15
(R.St.J. Macdonald & D.M. Johnston eds., 1983) (my translation from French).
4 Id. at 428 (my translation from French and emphasis added).
I See Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 397, 401-403 (1987).
1 See Charles Rousseau, Les sujets de Droit, in Tome II DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 472
(1974) (The French term "competence," used by Rousseau is equivalent to "jurisdiction" in
English.).
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the state will be subject to the internal democratic processess and insti-
tutions. For example, the population, through its elective representa-
tives, might well exercise an appreciable control over the state
apparatus.
External Sovereignty is that part of a state's power which is sub-
ject to the limits imposed by international law, but is accountable to no
other state. In his separate concurring opinion in the Austro-German
Customs Regime Case, Judge Azilotti stated that independence could
be described as "sovereignty (suprema potestas), or external sover-
eignty, by which is meant that the state has over it no other authority
than that of international law."'7 He added that "[i]ndependence as
thus understood is really no more than the normal condition of
states. .. ". He explained that the abnormal condition was that of de-
pendent states, which were still numerous at that time.9 Today, inde-
pendence or sovereignty is virtually the universal rule and it is the ex-
ternal aspect of sovereignty which give us the complete picture of the
concept.
Those two aspects of sovereignty may now be found in the Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the Interna-
tional Law Commission, in 1949. The first, internal sovereignty, is ex-
pressed in the form of a right, as follows: "Every state has the right to
independence and hence to exercise freely, without dictation by any
other state, all its legal powers, including the choice of its own form of
government." 10 This is basically what we have described as internal
sovereignty. The second aspect, external sovereignty, is formulated in
the form of a duty: "Every state has the duty to conduct its relations
with other states in accordance with international law and with the
principle that the sovereignty of each state is subject to the supremacy
of international law.""
It is obvious from the above that state sovereignty is a relative and
not an absolute concept. Otherwise, it would constitute a denial of in-
ternational law itself. As Professor Scelle put it, "a state cannot at the
same time be competent to determine its own competence and be a
subject of international law."' 2
The difficulty is in determining, in precise terms, the limitations
imposed by international law. As Sir Robert Jennings has written,
"[n]obody can doubt the subjection of the sovereign state to interna-
tional law; but the problem of the effective institutionalization of that
subjection is in many ways the most difficult and the most crucial one
1931 P.C.I.J. REP. (ser. A/B) No. 41, at 57.
8 Id.
9 Id.
20 1949 I.L.C. Y.B. 286, at 287.
1 Id. at art. 14 (emphasis added).
12 Scelle, supra note 1, at 102 (my translation).
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of modern international relations." 13
II. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES
A. Meaning of Equality of States
The doctrine of the equality of sovereign states stems from the
democratic concept of the equality of individuals before the law. It is
considered a fundamental right of states to be treated in complete
equality under international law, regardless of their degree of political
power or influence. For instance, in legal theory, the consent of small
states to be bound by international treaties is as necessary as that of
the powerful ones. Of course, it is obvious that legal equality does not
equate political equality. The less influential states are sometimes
forced to recognize special rights to Great Powers, because of the lat-
ter's special responsibilities.
B. Diplomatic Conferences, the Covenant and the UN Charter
The principle of equality of states has been recognized in the rep-
resentation at diplomatic conferences ever since the Peace of Westpha-
lia. Subsequently, with the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1885 and
the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the principle was
translated into one state one vote and in the adoption of the rule of
unanimity on substantive questions. In the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the equal representation was maintained in the Assembly, as
was the unanimity rule for resolutions on substantive matters. How-
ever, an exception was made to the principle of state equality in the
membership of the Council where the Great Powers were allowed per-
manent seats.
In 1945, the principle of the equality of states was given the most
prominent place in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which contains the
seven basic principles of the Organization. That article provides that
"the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members." 14 The principle is reflected in the voting procedure of
the General Assembly where all member states are represented and
each member has one vote.' 5 The question of weighted-voting was
briefly discussed at the San Francisco Conference and has often been
suggested since, but the state equality principle has remained intact in
so far as the General Assembly is concerned.
As for the Security Council, a limitation to the principle is re-
flected in its composition where only the Big Powers enjoy a permanent
representation. An additional and most important limitation is that of
13 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 278, 289 (1984).
14 Id. at U.N. CHARTER art. 2, T 1.
Id. at art. 18.
[Vol. 20:19 1994
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the special voting power of the permanent members on substantive
matters, commonly referred to as the veto.16 This special voting power
had been agreed upon at Yalta by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, in
February 1945. It was then presented to the San Francisco Conference
in June of the same year, in a joint declaration by the four inviting
powers. They stated that, because of their special responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, the special voting
power was an essential condition for the creation of the Organization.
This most important limitation is still in the Charter today and it is
bound to remain, since its removal would require an amendment to the
Charter to which the Big Powers would have to consent.
C. Confirmation as a Principle of International Law
Aside from the special voting right of the Big Powers in the Secur-
ity Council, the principle of state equality has been reiterated on count-
less occasions at the United Nations, in particular, on the occasion of
the commemorative session of the United Nations' twenty-fifth anniver-
sary in 1970. The General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled
"Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations," (Declaration) in which the principle of
sovereign equality of states is fully spelled out. The Declaration stipu-
lates that "[a]ll states enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights
and duties and are equal members of the international community, not-
withstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other
nature."'"
The Declaration goes on to particularize the elements of the prin-
ciple, such as legal equality, respect of state personality, freedom of
choice as to the internal regime, territorial integrity and political
independence.
Sovereign equality appears also as the first of the ten principles
agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act (the Helsinki Accord) of 1975.
The principle states that
[t]he participating states will respect each other's sovereign equality
and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed
by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to
juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political
independence.18
Linked with sovereign equality, is the territorial integrity and political
16 Id. at art. 27.
17 Declaration on Principles, Resolution 2625 (XXV), reproduced in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1296-7
(1970).
18 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act [hereinafter referred to as
Helsinki Accord], reproduced in 14 1.L.M. 1292, 1293 (1975) (emphasis added).
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independence of a state.
III. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
A. Acceptance as a Principle of Law
The expression "territorial integrity and political independence"
first appeared in the Covenant which provided that "[t]he Members of
the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external ag-
gression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of
all Members of the League."19 In 1945, this protection against an act
of aggression was extended in the U.N. Charter to cover "any threat or
use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any
State."20
The twin principle was also incorporated in the Charter of the
OAS in 1948,21 as well as in the Helsinki Accord of 1975. In the latter
case, these two aspects of sovereignty are mentioned under three princi-
ples: sovereign equality, abstention from the threat or use of force, and
territorial integrity of states.22 The expressions also appear in numerous
U.N. documents.
B. The Legal Content of the Principle
This twin principle has remained rather imprecise, but its basic
elements are contained in a number of instruments, particulary the
Declaration on Principles of International Law of 1970 and the Hel-
sinki Accord of 1975.
Territorial Integrity means that a state is entitled to exercise com-
plete control and possession of its territory, that it should not be subject
to the threat or use of force by another state and that its existing inter-
national boundaries should not be violated. Also, the territory of a
State should not be the object of military occupation, resulting from
the use of force. In addition, it is expressly provided in both the 1970
Declaration and the 1975 Accord that the exercise of the right of self-
determination of peoples should not dismember or impair the territorial
integrity or political unity of a state.2 Territorial integrity was also
emphasized throughout the Lusaka Declaration adopted in 1970 by 53
non-aligned countries. 4
Political independence means basically that a state is free to
19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.
20 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
21 OAS CHARTER art. 28.
22 See Helsinki Accord, supra note 18, at 1293-4.
23 See Declaration on Principles, supra note 17, at 1296, and Helsinki Accord, supra note 18,
at 1295.
24 Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation and Democratisa-
tion of International Relations, 10 (1970), reproduced in 10 I.L.M. 215 (1971).
[Vol. 20:19 1994
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"choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems
as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations."2 5 This free-
dom of choice is also considered as one of the components of non-
intervention.
IV. NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
A. Acceptance as a Principle of Law
Although the principle of non-intervention contained in the U.N.
Charter applies only to the Organization as such, 6 it has long been the
practice of states to respect that principle among themselves and it is
now unquestionably part of customary international law. A number of
U.N. resolutions and international instruments have confirmed this.
As far back as 1965, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
stating that "no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State."2 7 In 1970, the same principle was included in the Declaration
On Principles, where the prohibition was enlarged to include "a group
of States." 28 This broad prohibition is also found in the Charter of the
0AS29 and in Principle VI of the Helsinki Accord."
B. Application of the Principle by the International Court
The principle of non-intervention, as part of customary interna-
tional law, was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case of 1986. The Court stated clearly that "the principle of
non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct
its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass
against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is
part and parcel of customary international law."31 The Court went on
to make an important pronouncement as to what constitutes a prohib-
ited intervention, in the following terms:
• . .the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene
directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A
prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to
decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Interven-
tion is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such
25 Principle I, Helsinki Accord, supra note 18, at 1293.
26 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
17 G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. Doc. (1965).
28 See Declaration on Principles, supra note 17, at 1295.
2 OAS CHARTER art. 18.
20 See Helsinki Accord, supra note 18, at 1294-5.
32 1987 I.C.J. REP., para. 202.
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choices, which must remain free ones.32
As a general prohibition, it contains three elements: first, it applies
to groups of states as well as to individual ones; second, it encompassess
both indirect and direct interventions; and third, those interventions
may relate not only to the internal but also the external affairs of a
state. With respect to the subject matters on which a prohibited inter-
vention may bear, they are all those upon which a sovereign state may
decide freely. This freedom includes the choice of a state's own system:
political, economic, social and cultural.
V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN FOREIGN COURTS
A. The Doctrine of Absolute Immunity
The traditional principle, at least in common law jurisdictions, was
that the sovereign could do no wrong, neither at home nor abroad. The
sovereign enjoyed absolute immunity before the domestic courts and,
because of the equality of states, the same absolute immmunity applied
before foreign courts. A sovereign state was not to be embarrassed
before the courts of another state. 3
After World War II, when states began to engage more exten-
sively in commercial activities, the principle of sovereign immunity be-
came limited to the performance of a public sovereign act of state
called jure imperii. If the act of state was done in its private capacity
and as a commercial activity, known as jure gestionis, the state immu-
nity disappeared. This became known as the doctrine of restrictive im-
munity. The latter doctrine was adopted by the United States and the
United Kingdom in the late 70's and by Canada, in 1982. Before then,
the Supreme Court of Canada had been very reluctant to consider the
doctrine of restrictive immunity as forming part of the law of Canada
through customary international law.
In 1971, in a majority decision, the Court held that a contract
made in Canada between the Congo Republic and a Montreal archi-
tect, for the construction of a national pavilion at an international exhi-
bition, was a public rather than a private act. 4 In deciding as to the
32 Id. at para. 205.
33 It is the same principle which is at the basis of the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by
diplomatic representatives. A diplomatic agent has complete immunity from the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state and a considerable degree of immunity from its civil and adminsitrative
jurisdiction. The latter applies only when the action relates to three matters: a private immovable
property, a private succession and a professional or commercial activity. See Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, art. 43. Under the Vienna Convention, the diplomatic agent is prohibited
from practicing a profession for personal profit or engaging on a commercial activity. However, if
he contravenes this prohibition, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the civil and administrative
tribunals of the receiving State. Id. at art. 49.
11 Congo v. Venne, 1971 S.C.R. 997.
[Vol. 20:19 1994
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nature of the act, Richie J., writing for the majority, seemed to have
applied the purpose test, when he stated that the question to be an-
swered was whether the contract in question "was a public act done on
behalf of the sovereign state for state purposes."35 In a strong dissent
in that case, Laskin J. observed that "neither the independence nor the
dignity of states, nor international comity require vindication through a
doctrine of absolute immunity." 6
B. The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity in Canadian Legislation
(1982)
In 1982, Canada adopted the State Immunity Act which defined
"commercial activity" by reference to the nature rather than the pur-
pose of a particular transaction. The definition stipulates that commer-
cial activity means "any particular transaction, act or conduct or any
regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature is of a commer-
cial character." 37 This definition is quite similar to the one found in the
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 which pro-
vides that "the commercial character of an activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular trans-
action or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."38
C. The Entire Context Approach in the Supreme Court of Canada
(1992)
Since the Canadian definition does not expressly exclude the pur-
pose of a particular transaction, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a
1992 decision, was able to examine both the purpose and nature of the
act in question. The case concerned a group of about 60 Canadian ci-
vilian employees working for the U.S. navy at its base in Argentia,
Newfoundland, established during World War II under a lend-lease
agreement. The workers were paid in Canadian currency, paid Cana-
dian income tax and contributed to the Canadian Pension Plan and
Unemployment Insurance. The U.S. Navy agreed to collective bargain-
ing under U.S. labor law, but when it was determined that relevant
American legislation was not applicable, the Public Service Alliance of
Canada applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification
of the employees as a bargaining unit. The Board held that it had juris-
diction over the civilian employees of the base, but stayed certification
proceedings so that the question of state immunity could be referred to
the Federal Court of Appeal.
The Federal Court held that the certification proceedings fell
I1 d. at 1003 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 1016.
37 R.S.C., ch. 95, § 2 (emphasis added).
" Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (emphasis added).
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within the commercial activity exception of the Act and that the
United States could not claim state immunity.39 In so deciding, the
Federal Court found that the purpose test, which was explicitly ex-
cluded in the American definition of commercial activity, was implic-
itly excluded in the Canadian definition. Applying the nature test only,
it held that a certification proceeding related to the employment of
members of the proposed bargaining unit under a contract for services
with the United States, and that its contract was of a commercial na-
ture. The opinion of Chief Justice Iacobucci was that if the courts were
permitted to look at the purpose, this would broaden the scope of im-
munity to make it as wide as under the traditional absolute theory.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, all of the five judges
who heard the appeal were in agreement that the Canadian definition
of commercial activity did not preclude the Court from considering the
purpose of the activity in question. The two minority judges, however,
disagreed with the United States argument that, since the essential
purpose of the base was national defense, the hiring of workers at the
base fell within the scope of public acts of sovereign states. Corry J.,
who wrote the dissent, said that "[a] state may not rely on the ultimate
purpose of an activity to qualify its acts."'41 He concluded that "[t]he
act of hiring support service employees was one which a private person
could undertake. It was in the nature of a commercial activity. "42
In following a similar approach, the majority came to an opposite
conclusion. La Forest J., writing the majority judgement, stated: "Na-
ture and purpose are interrelated, and it is impossible to determine the
former without considering the latter. I do not accept that the defini-
tion of "commercial activity" in the Act precludes consideration of its
purpose. '43 He agreed with the statement of Lord Wilberforce in a
1983 decision that "the purpose is not decisive but it may throw some
light upon the nature of what was done."' 44 In examining the nature of
the activity in question, he held that the employment contract at the
naval base had sovereign, as well as commercial, attributes. He was of
the opinion that "[w]hile bare employment contracts are primarily
commercial in nature, the management and operation of a military
base is undoubtedly a sovereign activity.14 5 "In the result," he con-
cluded, "the 'activity' at Argentia had a double aspect. It is at once
sovereign and commercial." 46 He held that the employment contract
"' See 1 F.C. 332 (1990).
40 See USA v. The Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2 S.C.R. 50 (1992).
41 Id. at 108.
4' Id. at 109.
43 Id. at 70.
44 Id. at 73.
15 Id. at 80.
48 Id.
[Vol. 20:19 1994
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could not be taken in isolation but that "the entire context of the activ-
ity at Argentia must be considered. 47 He agreed with the Attorney
General of Canada that the objective of the Canada Labour Relations
Board proceedings was the imposition of collective bargaining by the
Canadian State and under the control of the Canadian Court. He,
therefore, held that "the nexus between this objective and the manage-
ment of the base constitutes an unacceptable interference with Ameri-
can sovereignty. 48 Since the Board could impose terms in a collective
agreement, reinstate employees and rescind disciplinary actions taken
by the Base commander, "these would be unacceptable intrusions into
the sovereign realm of the Argentia base. 49
This decision, as already pointed out by one commentator, must
not be interpreted as a return to the absolute immunity doctrine.50 In
this case, the sovereign aspect of the activity in question predominated
over the commercial one, taking all relevant circumstances into ac-
count. It will remain a matter for determination in each case, when
applying the doctrine of restrictive immunity, which of the two aspects
of the activity is predominant.
It is evident that the restrictive doctrine is now on the point of
becoming a general rule of international law. This is evident from the
Draft Convention prepared by a Commitee of the International Law
Association in 1982 and from its Report in 1990.51 This process is even
more evident in the Third Report of the International Law Commission
on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property. ' 52 The re-
strictions and exceptions to the traditional principle of absolute immu-
nity are becoming more and more important and numerous.
VI. SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A. Humanitarian Intervention by the Red Cross and Other NGO's
Intervention by the Red Cross and other humanitarian organiza-
tions, to come to the rescue of victims of armed conflicts, is specifically
provided for in one of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two
Optional Protocols of 1977. These are part and parcel of international
humanitarian law. The legal basis for what are called "relief actions" is
found in the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War of 1949, as well as in Protocol I applicable to interna-
"1 Id. (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 81.
49 Id. at 83.
50 Ross Hornby, State Immunity Re Canada Labour Code: A Common Sense Solution to
the Commercial Activity Exception, 30 CYIL 301, 315 (1992).
" See Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity, I.L.A. REPORT, Montreal Confer-
ence (1982) and I.L.A. REPORT, Queensland Conference (1990).
52 11 I.L.C. Y.B. 3 (1990).
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tional armed conflicts and in Protocol II on non-international armed
conflicts. Under the 1949 Convention, the Contracting Parties have an
obligation to allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and
hospital stores intended only for civilians, even if those are nationals of
an adversary."3 This provision is completed by Protocol I, applicable to
international armed conflicts, which provides for relief actions, when
food, medical supplies, clothing or shelter are inadequate for the sur-
vival of the civilian population. In such cases, "relief actions which are
humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any
adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the
Parties concerned in such relief actions."5 It must be noted that the
relief actions must be not only humanitarian and impartial, but also
agreed upon by the Parties. In addition, the personnel participating in
relief actions, in particular for the transportation and distribution of
relief consignments, must obtain the "approval" of the Party in whose
territory the relief action is being carried out.55 The Parties to the con-
flict undertake to grant to the International Committee of the Red
Cross all the necessary facilities to carry out its humanitarian assis-
tance to the victims of conflicts. However, this is always "subject to the
consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned. '56
As for relief actions in cases of non-international armed conflicts,
the sovereignty of the state becomes even more paramount and the
non-intervention principle is specifically incorporated into Protocol II.
It provides that nothing in the Protocol may be invoked "for the pur-
pose of affecting the sovereignty of a state or the responsibility of the
government" or "as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or
external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which
that conflict occurs."5 7 With respect to the authorization of relief ac-
tions, the Red Cross and other relief societies are free to offer their
services to come to the rescue of the victims of an armed conflict but
such actions are "subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party
concerned."58
As for the NGO's other than the Red Cross, such as the Doctors
Without Borders, they find a legal basis for their assistance in Protocol
I, although in a more limited way than for the Red Cross. Article 81
provides that the Parties to the conflict must, "as far as possible, make
facilities ... available to other humanitarian organizations ... which
are, duly authorized by the respective Parties to the conflict," to carry
" Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, art. 23.
4 Protocol I on International Conflicts, art. 70 (emphasis added).
" Id. at art. 71, para. 1.
" Id. at art. 81, para. 1.
" Protocol II, on Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 3.
68 Id. at art. 18 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 20:19 1994
12
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 20 [1994], Iss. , Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol20/iss/7
Pharand--SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT (CAN.)
out their humanitarian functions.59 In the case of internal conflicts,
Protocol II does not specifically mention "other humanitarian organiza-
tions" but it does provide for "relief societies ... such as Red Cross...
organizations" to offer their services and for consent to be obtained.60
In brief, relief actions by the Red Cross and other humanitarian
organizations are provided for in both types of armed conflicts, but they
are always subject to the consent of the Parties or Party.
B. Humanitarian Intervention by States
1. Intervention by an individual State
The question arises whether an individual State may be permitted
to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of an armed conflict, par-
ticularly if it is an internal one. The International Court of Justice ad-
dressed this question briefly in the Nicaragua case, when examining the
nature of the assistance which the United States had been authorized
by Congress to bring to the contras. The Court stated:
.. .There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian
aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political
affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention,
or as in any other way contrary to international law."'
After quoting from the fundamental principles enunciated by the
Red Cross at its Twentieth International Conference, the Court formu-
lated the conditions under which humanitarian assistance could not be
considered as an unlawful intervention:
In the view of the Court, if the provision of "humanitarian assistance"
is to escape condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of
Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the purposes hallowed in the
practice of the Red Cross, namely "to prevent and alleviate human
suffering," and "to protect life and health and to ensure respect for
the human being"; it must also, and above all, be given without dis-
crimination to all in need in Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and
their dependents.6 2
It follows from this statement by the Court that, for humanitarian
intervention to be lawful, the assistance provided must meet two basic
conditions: first, it must be limited to alleviating suffering and protect-
ing health and second, it must be given without discrimination to all in
need. These are the same conditions which are found in both Protocols
and which are applicable to the Red Cross and other humanitarian
Protocol I, art. 81, para. 4.
eo Protocol II, art. 18.
61 1986 ICJ REP. para. 242.
62 Id. at para. 243.
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organizations. 3
It goes without saying that such unilateral humanitarian assistance
would have to be carried out without any use of force, unless such use
could can be justified under the extended doctrine of "self defense,"
which is most unlikely. It has been shown on a number of occasions
that the use of force for the protection of civilian populations, be they
nationals or non nationals, have met with general condemnation. A few
examples are: India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Tanzania's
intervention in Uganda in 1978, and the U.S. interventions in the Do-
minican Republic (1965), Grenada (1982), Panama (1989) and Nica-
ragua (1982).
2. Intervention by a Group of States
The limitations applicable to a single state to justify humanitarian
assistance apply essentially to a group of states, unless the latter can be
considered as acting under U.N. authorization. As for the U.N. itself, a
police action for humanitarian reasons may be justified, even in a case
of a non-international conflict, if the situation is considered serious
enough to constitute a threat to international peace and security and
thus within the purview of Chapter VII of the Charter. This was done
in 1991, when the United Nations decided to come to the rescue of the
Kurds in Iraq.
On April 5 of 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688
in which it referred specifically to its responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security and insisted "that Iraq allow imme-
diate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in
need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all neces-
sary facilities for their operations."64 Since the resolution was adopted
under Chapter VII, the operation was without Iraq's consent and in
spite of its protest that it was a breach of its sovereingty. Subsequent to
that resolution, a group of states consisting of Britain, France, the
Netherlands and the United States, sent troops in northern Iraq to es-
tablish a humanitarian enclave for the protection of the Kurds. This,
too, was done without the consent of Iraq, but the group of states in
question acted under the general authorization, at least by implication,
of the United Nations. Such humanitarian actions were possible be-
cause of the unanimous and world-wide condemnation of the govern-
ment of Iraq. When the condemnation is not as unanimous and the
interests of potential intervening countries do not sufficiently coincide,
such as in the armed conflicts of Ethiopia, Sudan, Bosnia, Burundi and
Rwanda, sovereignty continues to constitute a considerable obstacle.
3 See Protocol I, art. 70 and Protocol II, art. 18.
U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), reproduced in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991).
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VII. THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY: A TENTATIVE PROGNOSIS
All social institutions must evolve with changes in society. This
evolution is an inevitable social phenomenon which, in the international
community, states are not escaping. The principle of state sovereignty
has evolved along with international law and the meaning of state sov-
ereignty has undergone changes.
Traditionally, a sovereign state had the right to use force, resort to
war, attack other states, conquer new territories, etc. Gradually, states
had to accept certain limitations on their sovereignty such as contained
in the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), the Briand-Kellogg
Pact (1928) and the United Nations Charter (1945). States can no
longer resort to war, not even to the use of force except in self-defense;
and, even then, only as a temporary measure or as part of an enforce-
ment action by the United Nations. In addition, states have accepted
being legally bound by numerous law-making conventions imposing
certain restrictions on their traditional discretionary power.
Now, with the globalization of international relations, the question
may be asked whether the very principle of state sovereignty is still
viable. Boundaries are becoming more and more artificial and some
people hope for an eventual world federation. For the moment, such a
hope is closer to a dream than reality.
The principle of state sovereignty, along with its corollaries, is still
a fairly solid corner-stone of international law. The acceptance of limi-
tations on that principle takes a long time to materialize, as we have
seen in the areas of jurisdictional immunity and humanitarian interven-
tion. A similar slow progress is evident in the other areas of interna-
tional law where sovereignty plays an important role.
The fact remains that there is a need in the international commu-
nity for the system of sovereign states to evolve in such a way that a
greater degree of peace and security in the world becomes possible. Af-
ter the two world wars, Europe has understood that need and has
evolved accordingly. It began with economic integration and is gradu-
ally developing a regional political system which might eventually serve
as a model for the rest of the world. States of the European Commu-
nity have exchanged a lesser sovereignty for a greater security and
prosperity. Even in the delicate field of human rights, the twenty-one
member states of the Council of Europe are now parties to the most
highly developed instrument in the world. Since 1991, an individual
may take a complaint personally to the European Court on Human
Rights, providing the petition has been declared receivable by the
Human Rights Commission.
Can this kind of achievement be emulated on a world-wide basis?
For the moment, unfortunately, it is not possible. The belief in certain
basic norms and values would be a pre-requisite, and such a belief does
not appear to exist. Certainly, there is yet no apparent erosion of the
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concept of the sovereign state, in spite of certain limitations. State sov-
ereignty will probably remain the best option for a long time, but we
must all work without respite to accelerate its adaptation to the funda-
mental human needs of the international community.
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